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Abstract. This paper analyzes corporatism in a two-player game which 
integrates macroeconomic stabilization policy and a policy of social 
transfers. The government decides on the level of nominal social 
transfers, and the trade union decides on the nominal wage level. A 
central finding is that if one assumes that the trade union’s utility not 
only depends on employment, output and inflation, but also on the level 
of social transfers, there is always scope for Pareto-improvements, 
relative to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. In particular, there 
always exists a bargained combination of lower wages and higher social 
benefits that is beneficial for both players. Another important result is 
that an increase in the degree of inflation aversion of the trade union 
leads to a lower wage level, a lower level of inflation and a higher level 
of output. The effect on social transfers depends, among other things, on 
the degree of inflation aversion of the government. Finally, the paper 
provides a detailed analysis of when the wage level and the level of 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes corporatism in a two-player game which integrates
macroeconomic stabilization policy and a policy of social transfers. The
government decides on the level of nominal social transfers, and the trade
union decides on the nominal wage level. A central ￿nding is that if one
assumes that the trade union￿ s utility not only depends on employment,
output and in￿ ation, but also on the level of social transfers, there is al-
ways scope for Pareto-improvements, relative to the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium. In particular, there always exists a bargained combination of
lower wages and higher social bene￿ts that is bene￿cial for both players.
Another important result is that an increase in the degree of in￿ ation
aversion of the trade union leads to a lower wage level, a lower level of in-
￿ ation and a higher level of output. The e⁄ect on social transfers depends,
among other things, on the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the government.
Finally, the paper provides a detailed analysis of when the wage level and
the level of social transfers are strategic complements or substitutes for
each of the players.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study corporatism in the context of an economic model which
integrates issues related to macroeconomic stabilization and issues related to a
policy of social transfers. Moreover, although we will assess the e⁄ects of corpo-
ratism on the macroeconomic performance of an economy, our main contribution
consists of a microeconomic analysis of the e⁄ects of corporatism on the deci-
sions and utility levels of the corporatist parties. Our approach to corporatism is
based on Cubitt￿ s (1995) analysis. While traditionally most researchers use the
degree of centralization (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, 1988) or coordination (Soskice,
￿We want to thank A. Van Poeck and R. Cubitt for their useful suggestions and comments
on an earlier version of the paper. We also acknowledge ￿nancial support from the National
Bank of Belgium.
11991) of wage bargaining as the main index for corporatism, Cubitt assumes
an economy with perfectly centralized wage bargaining, and investigates the
e⁄ects of several other aspects of corporatism on economic performance. Two
such aspects are the views (1) that corporatism exists when the policy game
is played cooperatively, and (2) that the degree of corporatism in the economy
increases when the in￿ ation aversion of the trade union increases. The former
aspect refers to the possibility of achieving Pareto-improvements, starting from
a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. This aspect will also be called the scope
for corporatism. The latter aspect re￿ ects the view that the trade union￿ s in￿ a-
tion aversion can be interpreted as a measure of corporatism: the more a union
internalizes the negative e⁄ects of in￿ ation, i.e. the more in￿ ation averse it is,
the greater the degree of corporatism in the economy.
In a recent paper Di Bartolomeo et al. (2006) study corporatism in terms of
a game between a monopolistic trade union and the government. They conclude
that in their model there is no scope for corporatism. More speci￿cally, the trade
union can never gain from cooperation. Our present paper shows that this result
follows from the very speci￿c model they use. We show that in a more general
model there are at least two reasons why the trade union could possibly bene￿t
from corporatism.
First, if the trade union is assumed to be in￿ ation averse, we show that it will
bene￿t from cooperation. Di Bartolomeo et al. (2006) consider a model in which
the trade union￿ s utility function is in￿ ation independent. However, Calmfors
& Dri¢ ll (1988) already emphasized the importance of whether or not wage
setters consider the in￿ ationary consequences of their actions. An in￿ ation-
averse union may be willing to deliver wage restraint in order to stabilize prices.
Cubitt (1995) also takes this possibility into account, and considers an in￿ ation-
averse union. His analysis is focused on macroecononomic stablization issues,
and is based on a speci￿c aggregate demand function incorporating the e⁄ects of
monetary policy. Our analysis speci￿es a much more general aggregate demand
function that takes into account both the budgetary and the social policy of the
government.
This social policy of the government is the second reason why the trade union
can bene￿t from corporatism. This argument is absent in Cubitt￿ s framework,
and may be of greater empirical importance than the in￿ ation aversion of the
trade unions. Given the low in￿ ation rates in the OECD during the last two
decades, the in￿ ation aversion of the trade unions was most probably of no
great importance in their negotiations with the government. However, if one
also incorporates social policy in the model, there is scope for corporatism,
even in an economy with an in￿ ation neutral union. This point is stressed e.g.
by Mares (2004, 2006) who writes that social policies are a crucial objective
for trade unions, which in￿ uences their optimal wage demands. She shows that
unions, especially during the decades after Word War II, have shown willingness
to deliver wage restraint in order to expand the welfare state without great costs
in terms of unemployment.
This linking of wage determination and social bene￿ts is also crucial in the
analysis of Burda (1997). He analyses the interaction between the nominal wage
2level and the level of unemployment bene￿ts in a social policy game between
the trade union and the government. He concludes that in the Nash equilibrium
of the game, corporatism, de￿ned in this context as cooperative play, leads to
welfare improvements for both players. His analysis, however, is solely based
on a social policy model, not including issues of macroeconomic stabilization.
Incorporating such policies in Burda￿ s model will also change his conclusions
with respect to the strategic complementarity or substitutability of the level of
wages and social bene￿ts.
Summarizing the above discussion, we can say that Cubitt￿ s model lacks
social policy, while Burda￿ s model lacks stabilization policy. Our paper aims to
incorporate both policies in one model. We consider a game between the govern-
ment and a monopolistic trade union whose decision variables are, respectively,
nominal social bene￿ts and nominal wages. We explicitly model how the deter-
mination of the wage level and of social bene￿ts are strategically interrelated.
In this model we mainly focus on two questions, which are two essential aspects
of corporatism as formulated by Cubitt (1995). First, how sensitive is the Nash
equilibrium to changes in the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the trade union?
This Nash equilibrium is analyzed both in terms of the target variables output
and in￿ ation, and in terms of the decision variables wages and social bene￿ts.
The answer is that an increase in the degree of in￿ ation aversion increases out-
put, and decreases in￿ ation and the wage level. The e⁄ect on the level of social
bene￿ts is ambiguous. Here the question arises whether social bene￿ts and the
wage level are strategic complements or substitutes. This issue will be analyzed
in detail. Our second research question relates to the scope for coporatism. We
will show that in our model delivering wage restraint and providing social ben-
e￿ts will always lead to a Pareto-improvement, relative to the nonncooperative
Nash equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. It de￿nes
the supply and demand side of the output market. After de￿ning the game,
the section concludes with the analysis of how the decisions of the government
and the trade union a⁄ect the equilibrium of the market. Section 3 is the
largest part of the paper, and analyzes the ￿rst research question mentioned
above. It fully describes the Nash equilibrium of the game, both in terms of
output and prices and in terms of the wage level and the level of social bene￿ts.
We analyze how this equilibrium changes if there is a change in the degree
of in￿ ation aversion of one of the players. At the same time, we determine the
conditions for wages and social bene￿ts to be strategic complements or strategic
substitutes for the players. Section 3 discusses our second research question. It
determines the scope for corporatism by examining the Pareto-optimality of the
Nash equilibrium. A ￿nal section concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we propose a simple short term model to describe the economy.
The model consists of a labor market and an output market. On the output
3market aggregate demand and supply determine the equilibrium values of output
and the price level. We then formally de￿ne the game we will analyze in this
paper: who are the players, what are the possible actions they can take, and
what are their preferences? Finally, we determine how changes in the actions of
the players a⁄ect aggregate output and the price level.
2.1 The Labor Market
Consider a production function y = f(n), where y is output and n is labor
input. We assume that the marginal product of labor f0(n) is positive and
decreasing. Let w and p be the nominal wage level and the price level per unit
of output, respectively. Consider a representative ￿rm which is a price taker
on the labor and the output markets. Pro￿t maximization requires that w
p =
f0(n). Labor demand is obtained as nd = f0￿1(w
p ) ￿ g(w
p ). The ￿rm￿ s supply
function of output is ys = f(nd) = f(g(w
p )) ￿ q(w
p ). From the assumption of
decreasing marginal product of labor it follows that q0(w
p ) < 0. Total population
is exogenously given by n . We assume that employment is only determined by
labor demand, and that g(w
p ) ￿ n. Finally, we assume that all workers are
unionized. We consider a short term model in which in￿ ation expectations are
not taken into account.
2.2 The Output Market
The demand side of the output market consists of the demand for output by
the private sector and by the government. Private demand is written as a
function C(p;yd), where yd is real disposable income. We denote by C1 and
C2 the partial derivatives of C(p;yd) with respect to p and yd. We assume that
C1 < 0, and that 0 < C2 < 1 . The ￿rst assumption is motivated by the
traditional arguments. First, there is the real balance e⁄ect. An increase of p
decreases the real value of wealth with a ￿xed nominal value. This decrease will
reduce aggregate demand. Secondly, a rise of p will decrease net exports of a
country. Finally, a rise of p reduces the supply of real money. This will increase
the interest rate, and reduce aggregate demand. Real disposable income is
de￿ned as follows. Wage income is taxed by a tax rate t , 0 < t < 1. The worker￿ s
net real wage is (1 ￿ t)w
p . We denote by b the nominal value of social bene￿ts
the government pays to a nonworking individual. Examples of such bene￿ts are
unemployment bene￿ts, pensions, etc. The total nominal amount spent by the





b. Real disposable income is
then de￿ned as
















If we denote the government￿ s demand on the output market by G, total
aggregate demand is given by C(p;yd) + G. The equilibrium condition on the
4output market is given by
C(p;yd) + G ￿ q(
w
p
) = 0 (2)


















Suppose now that the wage level or the social bene￿t level change, and that as
a result also the price level changes. If then the government wants to restore its
budgetary balance, it can do so by adjusting the level of government spending G,
or by adjusting the tax rate t. In the main text of this paper we will assume that
the government restores its budgetary balance by adjusting G, while keeping t



















) = 0 (4)
At the end of this paper (see section 5) we will discuss brie￿ y how the main
results change if one considers the alternative model in which t is used to restore
budgetary balance, while keeping G constant.
A more general model, which would reinforce the ideas of this paper, can be
obtained by having b include not only the social transfers to the nonworkers, but
also social bene￿ts (e.g. health insurance payments, child allowances, etc.) to a
certain fraction of the working population g(w
p ). If we denote this fraction by ￿,









If ￿ = 0, we obtain our previous model with yd as given in (1). If ￿ = 1, the
total population n is paid the same level of social bene￿ts b, independent of
being employed or not. One can expect that the union￿ s direct interest in b
increases with ￿. For reasons of simplicity, we will continue to use the simple
model with b including only social transfers to non-workers. One should keep
in mind, however, that b could actually be given a much broader interpretation,
including more bene￿ts to union members.
2.3 Description of the Game
The game we consider involves two players, the government and the trade union.
We assume that the government decides on the level of nominal social bene￿ts,
b, taking into account its budget constraint. The trade union has a monopoly on
the labor market, and decides on the nominal wage level w. The payo⁄functions
are speci￿ed analoguous to Cubitt (1995). However, we also incorporate the
social policy considerations of the trade union.
Both players are concerned about output performance and in￿ ation. We will
assume that the target price level, p￿, is the same for both players. Moreover,
we assume that p￿ is equal to the price level of a prior period. This implies that
5both players have an in￿ ation target of zero. In this way we can talk of prices
and in￿ ation interchangeably. The government￿ s output target is given by y￿
G,
which is compatible with full employment. Given the government￿ s bliss point
(y￿
G; p￿), its utility function is speci￿ed as
UG(y; p) = ￿￿G(y ￿ y￿
G)2 ￿ ￿
G(p ￿ p￿)2 (5)
where ￿G;￿
G ￿ 0, and ￿G + ￿
G = 1.
With respect to the trade union we assume that it wants to realize a wage
premium above the full employment wage. Its output target y￿
T is therefore
smaller than y￿
G. The trade union￿ s bliss point in the (y;p)-space is (y￿
T; p￿). We
also assume that the trade union has a direct interest in the level of the social
bene￿ts b. This is motivated by the union￿ s concern about the nonworkers￿
welfare. The trade union￿ s utility function is speci￿ed as
UT(y;p;b) = ￿￿T(y ￿ y￿
T)2 ￿ ￿
T(p ￿ p￿)2 + (1 ￿ ￿T ￿ ￿
T) b2 (6)
where ￿T;￿
T ￿ 0 and ￿T + ￿
T ￿ 1.
2.4 Price and output e⁄ects of changes in w and b
When the government and the trade union have decided on b and w, we assume
that the price level on the output market adjusts so that this market is in
equilibrium. We now describe this price adjustment.
Taking w and b as given, we have to solve equation (4) for p. Using (1),































) = 0 (7)
Clearly, the value of p that solves this equation depends on w and b. We denote
this dependence by the function p = ￿(w;b). In Appendix A we calculate the
derivatives ￿w(w;b) and ￿b(w;b), representing the price adjustments to changes
in the level of wages and social bene￿ts. We assume that the absolute value
of the price elasticity of the demand for labor j￿j is smaller than 1, which is in
accordance with empirical estimates of the labor demand function. Furthermore,
we assume that b < w and we impose a third restriction with respect to the
price and real bene￿t e⁄ects (see inequality (40) in Appendix A). Given these




￿w(w;b) < 1 (8)
and that
￿b(w;b) < 0 (9)
Inequality (8) states that the elasticity of the equilibrium price level with re-
spect to the nominal wage level is positive and smaller than one. The intuitive
6explanation for this is that a nominal wage increase will make labor more ex-
pensive, leading to a lower labor demand and a lower supply of output. The
resulting excess demand on the output market will cause prices to increase, but
less than proportionally. Inequality (9) states that an increase in the nominal
bene￿t level decreases the equilibrium price level. The intuition here is that,
given the government￿ s budget constraint, an increase in the nominal bene￿t
level will be accompanied by a decrease in government￿ s consumption level G.
As the marginal propensity to consume, C2, is assumed smaller than 1, this
must decrease aggregate excess demand and subsequently decrease the price
level on the output market.
We can now also derive the adjustment of the equilibrium output as a result































An increase in the nominal wage level decreases the equilibrium output level.
The same is true for an increase in the nominal bene￿t level. The intuition here
is clear from the discussion of (8) and (9) above.
3 The Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game can be determined in two di⁄erent
spaces: the (y; p)-space and the (w; b)-space. The approach in the (y;p)-space
is useful when assessing the e⁄ects of corporatism on output and in￿ ation. The
approach in the (w;b)-space can be used in assessing the microeconomic e⁄ects of
corporatism on the decision variables b and w. Cubitt￿ s analysis (1995) focuses
entirely on the (y; p)-space. In subsection 3.1 we apply this approach. In
subsection 3.2 we translate the results in the (y; p)-space to the (w; b)-space.
In order to ￿nd the NE, both subsections will start by determining the
reaction functions of both players. In the (w;b)-space, this will allow us to
derive conditions under which w and b are strategic complements or substitutes
for the players. After ￿nding the NE, we analyze the e⁄ects on this NE of an
increase of corporatism, de￿ned as an increase of the degree of in￿ ation aversion
of the trade union (￿
T).
3.1 Nash equilibrium in the (y; p) -space
We will ￿rst derive the "quasi-best-reply-loci" of the government and of the
trade union. We then study the NE. Finally, we investigate how this equilibrium
changes when the in￿ ation aversion of the trade union changes.
73.1.1 The Government￿ s Quasi-Best-Reply-Locus
We ￿rst introduce the set of all possible equilibrium combinations (y; p) the
government can attain by manipulating b, taking any value of w as given. This
set is formally de￿ned as
AG(w) =
￿
(y;p) j y = q(
w
￿(w;b)
); p = ￿(w;b) for b ￿ 0
￿
(12)
Note that, for any given value of w, this set coincides with the aggregate supply
curve y = q(w
p ). In this supply function we take the wage level w as given, while
changes in b cause changes in p through the function p = ￿(w;b):
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Figure 1 gives several examples of sets (or curves) AG(w), for di⁄erent values
of w. As q0(w
p ) < 0, the curve AG(w) shifts to the North as w increases. As in-
creases of b decrease the price level p (see (9)), increases of b move the point (y; p)
to the South-West along a given supply curve. The slope of such a supply curve
can be obtained by totally di⁄erentiating the equations
￿




for a given value of w, and solving for
dp









We now analyze the decision problem of the government. Using the equilib-
rium values y = q( w
￿(w;b)) and p = ￿(w;b), the government￿ s utility function in
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where y = q( w
￿(w;b)) and p = ￿(w;b). It is clear that the LHS of this FOC
represents the slope of the utility function (5) in the (y; p)-space. From (13)
we know that the RHS can be interpreted as the slope of the curve AG(w). It
follows that we can interpret (16) as the FOC of the problem
Max
y;p UG(y;p) s:t: (y;p) 2 AG(w) (17)
The solution of this problem is characterized by condition (16): at the optimal
point (y;p), the slope of the government￿ s indi⁄erence curve equals the slope
of the constraint AG(w). Problem (17) and the optimality condition (16) are
illustrated on Figure 1.
Solving problem (17) for various values of w, we obtain the locus of corre-
sponding solutions. Following Cubitt (1995) we call this locus the Quasi-Best-
Reply-Locus of the government, abbreviated as QBRLG. It is a best reply
function for the government de￿ned in the (y;p)-space, and not - as is common
- in the (w;b)-space. Note that increases of w shift the locus AG(w) to the
North. This causes a movement of the optimum (y;p) to the North-West along
the QBRLG . It follows that the government￿ s maximal attainable utility will
always decrease as w increases.
3.1.2 The Trade Union￿ s Quasi-Best-Reply-Locus
Similarly to (12), we can de￿ne the set of all equilibrium combinations (y; p)
which the trade union can attain by manipulating w, for any given value of b.
We denote this set by AT(b), which is formally de￿ned as
AT(b) =
￿
(y;p) j y = q(
w
￿(w;b)
); p = ￿(w;b) for w ￿ 0
￿
(18)
9In Cubitt￿ s model (1995) this set coincides with the aggregate demand func-
tion. In our model this is no longer true. The introduction of the locus
AT(b) is a signi￿cant generalization of Cubitt￿ s analysis. Let us ￿rst determine
the slope of the curve de￿ned by AT(b). Totally di⁄erentiating the equations ￿
y = q( w
￿(w;b))
p = ￿(w;b)
, with b given, and solving for
dp










￿ < 0 (19)
The intuition behind this negative slope is easy to understand. Take b as given,
and consider the e⁄ects of an increase of w . From (8) it follows that this will
increase the equilibrium price level p. As the elasticity of the equilibrium price
level p with respect to the wage level w is smaller than one (see again (8)),
the real wage w
p will increase. This will decrease the demand for labor and the
equilibrium level of output. Hence, for a given value of b, an increase of w will
increase the equilibrium price level p , and decrease the equilibrium output level
y. Moreover, an increase of b will shift the curve de￿ned by AT(b) to the South.
Indeed, at any given level of w and p , an increase of b will cause a decrease
of the government￿ s demand for output G. This follows from the government￿ s
budget constraint (3). This will lower the equilibrium level of output. Figure 1
gives several examples of curves AT(b), for various values of b.
Using the equilibrium values y = q( w
￿(w;b)) and p = ￿(w;b), the trade union￿ s
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where y = q( w
￿(w;b)) and p = ￿(w;b). The LHS of (22) represents the slope
of the utility function (6) in the (y;p)-space. By (19) the RHS of (22) can be
interpreted as the slope of the curve AT(b). It is clear that we can interpret
(22) as the FOC of the problem
Max
y;p
UT(y;p); s:t: (y;p) 2 AT(b) (23)
Condition (22) then requires that, at the optimal point (y;p), the slope of the
trade union￿ s indi⁄erence curve equals the slope of the curve AT(b). Problem
(23) and the optimality condition (22) are illustrated on Figure 1.
10Solving problem (23) for various values of b, we obtain the locus of corre-
sponding solutions. Again following Cubitt (1995), we call this locus the Quasi-
Best-Reply-Locus of the trade union, abbreviated as QBRLT. It is a best reply
function of the trade union, de￿ned in the (y;p)-space. Note that decreases of
b move the curve AT(b) to the North. This causes a movement of the optimum
(y;p) to the North-East along the QBRLT. As a result of such a movement, the
maximal attainable utility of the trade union will always decrease as b decreases.
3.1.3 Nash equilibrium
The NE can now easily be obtained as the intersection of QBRLG and QRLBT.
This is illustrated on Figure 1. The ￿gure shows that in our model the NE (yNE;
pNE) will always satisfy ￿
y￿
T < yNE < y￿
G
pNE > p￿ (24)
Note that pNE > p￿, even though there is unanimity among the players
about the target value p￿.
3.1.4 Sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium with respect to ￿
T.
We now determine the e⁄ects of an increase of the degree of in￿ ation aversion of
the trade union, ￿
T, on the NE (yNE; pNE). This is an important question. As
we have stated in the introduction, the trade union￿ s degree of in￿ ation aversion
can be interpreted as a possible degree of corporatism in an economy. See Cubitt
(1995).
Clearly, an increase of ￿
T leaves the QBRLG una⁄ected. It does, however,
a⁄ect the location of the QRLBT. Figure 2 illustrates what happens.
Start at any combination (y;p) on the original QRLBT, denoted by QRLBT
1 .
If ￿
T increases, the slope of the trade union￿ s indi⁄erence curve through this
point will increase. The slope of the curve AT(b) is not a⁄ected by the change
in ￿
T. It follows that, due to the increase of ￿
T, the new optimal point on
the curve AT(b) will be to the right of the original optimal point. The whole
QBRLT rotates clockwise around the point (y￿
T; p￿) from QBRLT
1 to QBRLT
2 .
The e⁄ects of an increase of ￿
T on the NE are now clear. If the in￿ ation aversion
of the trade union increases, the NE shifts from (yNE
1 ;pNE
1 ) to (yNE
2 ;pNE
2 ) . This
implies a lower value of pNE, and a higher value of yNE. Both e⁄ects increase
the utility level of the government. The following proposition summarizes our
discussion.
Proposition 1 If ￿
T increases, yNEincreases and pNE decreases.
This result con￿rms the result of Cubitt (1995): the higher the value of ￿
T
(and thus the more corporatist the behavior of the union), the more the union
will internalize the negative e⁄ects of in￿ ation and the better - according to the
government ! - will be the macroeconomic performance of the economy.
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Obviously, a similar analysis can be made on the e⁄ects of an increase of ￿
G.
In this case the QBRLG will rotate anticlockwise around the point (y￿
G;p￿). In
the new NE the price level pNE will be lower, while the output level yNE will
decrease. The trade union￿ s utility will increase.
3.2 Nash equilibrium in the (w;b)-space
In this subsection we want to characterize the foregoing NE (yNE;pNE) and
its sensitivity to changes in ￿
T in the (w; b)-space. As we are interested in
the e⁄ects of corporatism on macro-economic policy, it is important to know
how corporatism a⁄ects the government￿ s reaction to a change in w, and the
trade union￿ s reaction to a change in b. To a large extent, this analysis is
lacking in Cubitt (1995). This analysis in the (w;b)-space will also improve our
understanding of what happens in the (y;p)-space.
123.2.1 Best-Reply-Function of the Government
The best-reply-function of the government will be denoted by b = b(w). It
speci￿es for each level of w the corresponding best value of b; i.e. the value of
b that solves problem (15). An important question relates to the sign of the
slope of the function b(w): if the trade union would increase its wage demand
w, would the government then react by increasing or decreasing the level of
b ? In other words, are w and b strategic complements or substitutes for the
government? In his social policy model, Burda (1997) relates the slope of b(w)
to the preferences of the government. However, his analysis remains unclear
about the exact conditions that determine the slope of the government￿ s best-
reply-function.
On Figure 1 it is easy to see that in our model the slope of b(w) depends
critically on whether the curve AT(b) cuts the QBRLG from below or from
above. If the curve AT(b) cuts the QBRLG from below, then increases of w -
causing an upward movement along the QBRLG - lead to lower values of b, so
that the slope of b(w) is negative. In this case the two instruments w and b are
strategic substitutes for the government. Similarly, if the locus AT(b) cuts the
QBRLG from above, the slope of b(w) is positive, and the two instruments are
strategic complements for the government. The foregoing graphical arguments
are made more rigorous in Appendix B. There it is shown that








The slope of the curve AT(b) is given by (19), while the slope of the QBRLG
is given by (44) in Appendix B. These two slopes are complicated expressions:
they depend on ￿w(w;b) and ￿b(w;b) which themselves are rather complicated.
One of the variables a⁄ecting the slope of the QBRLG is the degree of in￿ ation
aversion of the government, ￿
G. We have seen in subsection 3.1.4 that increasing
the value of ￿
G rotates the QBRLG anticlockwise around the point (y￿
G; p￿).
One can expect that for a su¢ ciently high value of ￿
G the curve AT(b) cuts








instruments are then strategic complements. For su¢ ciently low values of ￿
G,
the two instruments are strategic substitutes. Equivalence (25) then leads to
the following result.
Proposition 2 If ￿
G is su¢ ciently high (low), then b and w are strategic com-
plements (substitutes) for the government
The intuitive explanation of this dependence of the slope of b(w) on ￿
G is
straightforward. An increase in w will lower output and increase the price level
on the output market. See (10) and (8). If the government cares very strongly
about in￿ ation relative to output, it will react to these changes by increasing
the value of b and lowering its demand G on the output market. (11) and (9)
show that this will indeed dampen the e⁄ect on in￿ ation and accentuate the
e⁄ect on output of the increase in w. On the other hand, if the government
13cares relatively more about employment, it will react to an increase of w by
decreasing b and increasing G.
Finally, we can identify one point (w;b) which must certainly lie on the
government￿ s best-reply-function. Let (w￿
G;b￿
G) represent the combination (w;b)
that leads to the government￿ s bliss point (y￿
G; p￿) in the (y; p)-space. In other
words, (w￿
G;b￿
G) is de￿ned as the combination of (w;b) such that the two curves
AG(w￿
G) and AT(b￿
G) intersect in the point (y￿
G; p￿) in the (y;p)-space (see Figure
1). These values of w and b must satisfy b￿
G = b(w￿
G).
3.2.2 Best-Reply-Function of the Trade Union
The trade union￿ s best-reply-function will be denoted by w = w(b). It is ob-
tained by solving problem (21). In his social policy model, Burda (1997) ob-
tains an unambiguously upward sloping best-reply-function for the trade union.
However, his model does not consider stabilization policy goals for the union,
in terms of output and in￿ ation.
From Figure 1 it is clear that in our model, analogous to section 3.2.1,
decreasing values of b will lead to increasing or decreasing values of w, depending
on whether the curve AG(w) cuts the QBRLT from above or from below. In
Appendix C we show rigorously that
Slope w(b) R 0 () Slope QBRLT Q Slope AG(w) (26)
Again, the slopes of QBRLT and of AG(w) are complicated expressions, but we
are most interested in the importance of the degree of in￿ ation aversion ￿
T of
the trade union. We have seen in subsection 3.1.4 that increasing the value of ￿
T
rotates the QBRLT clockwise around the point (y￿
T; p￿). For su¢ ciently high
values of ￿
T, one can expect that Slope QBRLT < Slope AG(w), so that the
two instruments are strategic complements. For su¢ ciently low values of ￿
T,
the two instruments are strategic substitutes for the trade union. The following
proposition then follows.
Proposition 3 If ￿
T is su¢ ciently high (low), then b and w are strategic com-
plements (substitutes) for the trade union.
The intuition here is also straightforward. Suppose the government decides
to decrease b, and to increase G. If then the trade union is very in￿ ation averse,
it will reply by lowering its wage claim w to avoid in￿ ationary pressures.
Finally, we can identify the combination (w￿
T;b￿
T) such that the intersection
in the (y;p)-space of the two curves AG(w￿
T) and AT(b￿
T) occurs in the trade
union￿ s bliss point (y￿
T; p￿) (see Figure 1). These values of w and b lie on the




Propositions 2 an 3 imply that we can distinguish four di⁄erent cases in de-
termining a NE in the (w;b)-space, depending on the slopes of the best-reply-
functions b(w) and w(b). Let us de￿ne a player￿ s in￿ ation aversion as "High"
14("Low") if for that player the two instruments are strategic complements (sub-









3 illustrates the nature the NE for each of the four possible cases.









the slopes of w(b) and b(w) have the same sign. Moreover, it is easy to verify
that in this case w(b) will always be steeper in absolute value than b(w) . Figure




Low). For the union, the optimal
change in w following a change in b will always be smaller than would be optimal














Low), the slopes of w(b) and b(w) have di⁄erent signs.
It is also interesting to investigate the stability of the NE. It is well known
that Nash Equilibria of the type given in Figure 3 are locally stable if and only
if the product of the absolute values of the slopes of the best-reply-functions
of the players is smaller than one, i.e. j b0(wNE) jj w0(bNE) j< 1 (see, e.g., Di
Bartolomeo and Pauwels, 2006). Using the argument of the previous paragraph,
we can conclude that the NE (wNE;bNE) is always locally stable in case the
players￿preferences are similar. A NE can fail to be stable only if preferences
are dissimilar.
3.2.4 Sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium with respect to ￿
T
Section 3.1.4 made clear that an increase of ￿
T changes the NE (yNE; pNE).
This change requires a change of the players￿ optimal decisions (wNE; bNE).
This section analyzes the changes in the (w;b)-space caused by an increase in
￿
T. We will see that, in contrast to the e⁄ects in the (p;y)-space, the sign of
the e⁄ects in the (w;b)-space do depend on the preferences of the government.
More speci￿cally, they depend on whether ￿
G is "Low" or "High".
An increase of ￿
T will leave b(w) unchanged, but it will cause w(b) to rotate
clockwise around (w￿
T;b￿
T). This result can again be derived from the (p;y)-
space, for each of the four cases. As an example, consider the case ￿
T
Low, which
is illustrated on Figure 2. At each level of b, the optimal w of the union decreases
if ￿
T increases (compare (w1;b2) with (w2;b2)). The negatively sloped w(b) will
become steeper. Analogously, one can show that for the case ￿
T
High, at each
level of b, the optimal w of the union increases with ￿
T. The positively sloped
w(b) will become ￿ atter.
Figure 4 shows, for each of the four cases, what happens to the NE in the
(w;b)-space if ￿
T increases. The ￿gure makes it clear that the sign of the
e⁄ect of ￿
T on wNE does not depend on the case considered. It will always be
negative. A union which is more in￿ ation averse will moderate its wage claims.
The e⁄ect on bNE, however, depends on ￿
G. If ￿
G is "Low", bNE will increase if
￿
T increases. If ￿
G is "High", bNE will decrease if ￿
T increases. The intuition
for this di⁄erent reaction by the government has already been made clear in
section 3.2.1. Table 2 summarizes the e⁄ects of an increase in ￿
T on (wNE;
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Note that our model unambiguously predicts, for any given value ￿
G, the
e⁄ects of an increase in ￿
T on wNE and bNE. However, the e⁄ects on the
replacement ratio b
w are not always clear. For the two cases where ￿
G
Low applies,
the replacement ratio will increase. However, in the cases where ￿
G
High applies,
we cannot predict the e⁄ect on b
w. In these latter cases, b and w change in the
same direction, and our analysis does not allow us to make statements about
the magnitudes of the changes in b and w.
To summarize, the theoretical discussion in section 3 predicts that an in-
crease of the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the trade union leads to a decrease
of in￿ ation, an increase of output and a decrease of nominal wages in the NE,
whatever the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the government. In addition, an
increase of ￿
T leads to an increase of social transfers in countries where ￿
G is
low, and to a decrease of social transfers when ￿
G is high.
4 Scope for Corporatism
According to Cubitt (1995), one possible interpretation of corporatism is that
players play the economic policy game cooperatively. Following Di Bartolomeo
et al (2006), there is scope for corporatism if, starting from the noncooperative
NE, cooperation could increase the payo⁄s of all the players. Put di⁄erently,
there can only be scope for corporatism if the NE is not Pareto e¢ cient. In the
model studied by Di Bartolomeo et al (2006) the authors conclude that the NE
is Pareto e¢ cient, so that there is no scope for corporatism. However, as we will
show in this section, this result is based on a very speci￿c model, in which the
trade union is not in￿ ation averse and in which social policy is not considered.
Using the more general model of the previous sections we will show that there
is always scope for corporatism.







@w , and evaluate them in the NE. If at least one
of these derivatives is non-zero, the NE is not Pareto e¢ cient. The pay-o⁄ of at
least one player could then be increased, without decreasing the other player￿ s
payo⁄. Using (14) we can calculate
@￿G(w;b)
@w
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18Wage moderation always increases the government￿ s payo⁄, relative to the
NE: it leads to a higher output and to lower in￿ ation. This same result also
follows from Figure 1: a decrease of w shifts the locus AG(w) to the South-East,

















Relative to the NE, the trade union would be better o⁄if the government would
increase the level of social bene￿ts. An increase of b contributes to a lower
output (and an associated increase of the real wage level) and lower in￿ ation.
There is also a positive direct welfare e⁄ect of an increase of social transfers.
Note that (28) still holds in case the union is not in￿ ation averse, i.e. ￿
T = 0.
(27) and (28) make clear that, relative to the NE, a combination of wage
moderation and an expansion of social bene￿ts would increase the payo⁄of both
players. Therefore, the NE is not Pareto-e¢ cient, and there is always scope for
corporatism.
The scope for Pareto improvements in the NE can also be seen graphically
on Figure 5. The dashed area on this ￿gure contains all combinations (w;b)
which increase the payo⁄ of both players, relative to the NE.
We can conclude that in our model a union is always motivated for reaching
a cooperative agreement, even if it is not in￿ ation averse. The threat of the
government to keep the level of social bene￿ts as low as bNE if the trade union
sticks to its high wage demand wNE, will make the union willing to negotiate.
The union is willing to o⁄er wage restraint in exchange for higher social transfers.
5 Endogeneous Tax Rates
Up to now we assumed that after changes in the wage or social bene￿t level the
government restores its budgetary balance by adjusting the level of its purchases
G. The tax rate t was assumed to remain constant. However, it is possible that
the government prefers to keep its level of purchases G constant, and that it
adjusts the tax rate t to restore the budgetary balance. This section discusses
this alternative model. As a matter of convenience, we will denote the ￿rst
model by Case 1, and the alternative model by Case 2.
The most fundamental di⁄erence between both models is the independency
of the equilibrium on the output market of the level of social bene￿ts b. The
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19Figure 5: Scope for Corporatism




) , ( b w
G p
) , ( b w
T p
It is clear that in this case the value of p that solves this equilibrium equation
only depends on w, not on b as in Case 1 (See (7)). We denote this equilibrium
price function as p = ￿2(w). As in Case 1, we can calculate the derivatives
￿2w(w) and ￿2b(w), representing the equilibrium price adjustments to changes




￿2w(w) < 1 (30)
and (trivially)
￿2b(w) = 0 (31)
The adjustment of the equilibrium output in Case 2 as a result of changes in w























20Compare (30) and (32) with (8) and (10), respectively. Although ￿2w(w)
will in general 1di⁄er from ￿w(w;b) , prices and output in both cases are sen-
sitive to changes in w, and the sensitivity works in the same direction. The
most important di⁄erence between the two models lies in the sensitivity of the
equilibrium on the output market to changes in b. To see this, compare (31) and
(33) with (9) and (11), respectively. It is clear that in Case 2, the equilibrium
on the output market is totally independent of b. To understand the intuition
of this, compare the e⁄ects of an increase in b between the two models. In both
models, the winners of this change are the non-workers, since their disposable
incomes increase. The losers, however, are di⁄erent in the two cases. In Case 1
the government loses because it decreases the amount of its purchases G by an
amount equal to the increased amount of the non-workers￿disposable income.
The workers are not a⁄ected by this measure. Given that the citizens￿marginal
propensity to consume is between 0 and 1, the negative e⁄ect on aggregate
demand of the decrease in G is higher than the positive e⁄ect on aggregate
demand of the increase in disposable income of the private sector. Therefore,
in Case 1, aggregate demand and prices decrease as b increases. In Case 2,
the workers are the losers because they have to pay higher taxes in order to
￿nance the non-workers￿increase in disposable income. In this case, the gov-
ernment is una⁄ected. Given the assumption that the marginal propensities to
consume of workers and non-workers are equal, the e⁄ect of an increase in b on
total aggregate demand is zero. The increased demand of non-workers is totally
compensated by the decreased demand of the working population.
The fact that the equilibrium on the output market in Case 2 does not de-
pend on b has important implications for the game we consider. The government
is now no longer able to in￿ uence output and prices by changing the level of
b. The trade union, however, still has the power to in￿ uence these variables
by changing w. Clearly, this reduces the government￿ s relative power in the
game. Changes in the equilibrium values of y and p; caused by changing wage
claims of the trade unions, can no longer be o⁄set by changing levels of b . As a
consequence, the government in Case 2 has no control at all over its own payo⁄
function (5). The trade union now has the monopoly power over stabilization
policy. The set AT(b), de￿ned in (18) is independent of b, and is given by a
single line in the (y;p)-space. If we then assume that (y￿
T;p￿) 2 AT, the trade
union is perfectly able to choose the wage level w so that it realizes its bliss
point (y￿
T;p￿). This is now the NE in the (y;p)-space. This is illustrated on
Figure 6. Note that AG(w) (see (12)) in case 2 only consists of a single point
for each level of w. Also note that the locus QBRLG disappears in Case 2.
As already noted, the set AT(b) is independent of b, and is denoted by AT.
The locus QBRLT now coincides with the bliss point (y￿
T;p￿) . Given that the
government has no power in Case 2 to in￿ uence the NE, its bliss point (y￿
G;p￿)
is a feasible combination of y and p only if it equals the bliss point (y￿
T;p￿) of
the trade union.












21Figure 6: Nash Equilibrium (p;y)-space case 2
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22Figure 7 represents the NE in the (w;b)-space for Case 2. This ￿gure should
be compared with Figure 3. Whereas we have four possible ￿gures in Case 1
depending on the relative in￿ ation aversion of the players, there is only one
possible ￿gure for Case 2. Since the payo⁄ of the government is independent of
b , the reaction correspondence of this player consists of the entire space R2
+.
As is clear from the discussion above, the reaction curve of the trade union,
w(b), must be a vertical line positioned at w￿, i.e. the value of w that leads to
(y￿
T;p￿). At the same time w(b) is the set of all NE in the (w;b)-space of Case
2.
One important result is that in Case 2, contrary to Case 1, a change in the
degree of in￿ ation aversion of the players does not change the NE, neither in
the (p;y)- nor in the (w;b)- space. The reason is that the trade union in Case
2 is not faced with a trade-o⁄ between its output and in￿ ation goals, y￿
T and
p￿. It is perfectly able to achieve both targets since it has the monopoly power
over stabilization policy. Therefore, the relative weight this player assigns to its
targets is not relevant. Neither does the NE depend on the government￿ s relative
degree of in￿ ation aversion, simply because this player can never in￿ uence the
NE in Case 2.
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Another important result is that, although the government does not have
any power regarding stabilization policy, it still has the power to in￿ uence the
payo⁄function of the trade union through social policy (see (6)). A higher level
of b increases the payo⁄ of the trade union:
@￿T(w;b)
@b
= 2(1 ￿ ￿T ￿ ￿
T)b > 0 (34)
23Moreover, the payo⁄ of the government remains sensitive to changes in w.










p2 < 0 (35)
Inequalities (34) and (35) show that the scope for corporatism remains, also in
Case 2. This can also be seen graphically on Figure 8.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, following Cubitt (1995), we focused on two characteristics of
corporatism. An economy is said to be more corporatist (1) if the trade union
is more in￿ ation averse, and (2) if all the policy makers can gain by cooperating
with each other. This approach led us to the following two research questions.
First, how will changes in the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the trade union a⁄ect
the performance of the economy? And secondly, what determines the extent to
which the government and the trade union can bene￿t from cooperation?
To analyze these questions we developed a model that integrates macroeco-
nomic stabilization and social policy. There are two policy makers, the gov-
ernment and the trade union. The government determines the level of social
bene￿ts, while the trade union determines the level of nominal wages. Following
a change in the level of social bene￿ts, the government is assumed to restore
budgetary balance either by adjusting its expenditures on the output market, or
by adjusting the tax rate. Both policy makers care about output, employment
and in￿ ation. Moreover, the trade union salso has a direct interest in the level
of social bene￿ts. We assume a competitive output market, in which the price
level adjusts to changes in demand and supply. In the Nash equilibrium of the
model, the output level is always between the target output levels of the trade
union and of the government. Although both policy makers are in￿ ation averse,
in￿ ation in the Nash equilibrium is positive.
We then investigated how changes of the trade union￿ s degree of in￿ ation
aversion a⁄ect the Nash equilibrium. An increase in the union￿ s in￿ ation aver-
sion will always increase output and decrease the equilibrium price and wage
levels, whatever the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the government. The e⁄ect
on the level of social bene￿ts is more ambiguous. It depends on whether social
bene￿ts and wages are strategic complements or substitutes for the government.
This, in turn, depends on the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the government. An
increase of the union￿ s degree of in￿ ation aversion leads to an increase of social
transfers in economies in which the government is not very in￿ ation averse, and
to a decrease of social transfers in economies in which the government is strongly
in￿ ation averse. It would be interesting to try to test all these implications em-
pirically.
In their stabilization policy game between the government and the trade
union Di Bartolomeo et al (2004) conclude that there is no scope for corporatism,
since the trade union will not bene￿t from cooperation. However, this result
24is based on the underlying strong assumption that the trade union only cares
about employment and wages. In particular, they assume that the trade union
is in￿ ation neutral. Moreover, there is no social policy in their model. A model
that includes a positive degree of in￿ ation aversion of the trade union would lead
to a di⁄erent conclusion. Starting in the Nash equilibrium, a trade union that
is in￿ ation averse will be willing to deliver wage restraint in order to decrease
in￿ ation. Even if the degree of in￿ ation aversion of the trade union is zero, the
scope for corporatism remains in a model that considers social policy goals of
the trade union. The threat of the government to keep the level of social bene￿ts
as low as to the social bene￿t level in the Nash equilibrium if the trade union
sticks to its high demand of wages, will make the union willing to negotiate.
An increase of the social transfers will always bene￿t the trade union. We
can conclude, therefore, that there always exists a cooperative agreement of
lower wages in exchange for higher social bene￿ts that is bene￿cial for both the
government and the trade union.
Appendix A Price and Output E⁄ects
In order to calculate the derivatives ￿w(w;b) and ￿b(w;b), we ￿rst simplify the
notation. From (7) it is clear that the aggregate excess demand on the output
market depends on p through three di⁄erent channels: (1) there is a direct price
e⁄ect of a change in p, keeping w
p and b
p constant, (2) there is a real wage e⁄ect,
as a change in p a⁄ects the real wage w
p , and (3), ￿nally, there is real bene￿t
e⁄ect, as a change in p also a⁄ects the real bene￿t b
p: Let us therefore rewrite



















One easily derives that
￿w(w;b) =
￿X2=p
X1 ￿ X2(w=p2) ￿ X3(b=p2)
(37)
where X1, X2;and X3 are the partial derivatives of X(p; w
p ; b
p) with respect to
p, w
p , and b
p. In order to determine the sign of ￿w(w;b), we ￿rst analyze the
signs of X1, X2;and X3.
Using the traditional arguments (also brie￿ y stated in the text) it is clear
that the direct price e⁄ect is negative, i.e. X1 = C1 < 0. One also easily derives
that
X2 = [C2(1 ￿ t) + t] g(
w
p










25X2 gives the e⁄ect of an increase in the real wage level on aggregate excess
demand. The symbol ￿ denotes the price elasticity of the demand for labor. We
will assume that j￿j < 1. The ￿rst term on the RHS of (38) is then positive.
Moreover, as q(w
p ) = f(g(w
p )), it follows that q0(w
p ) = f0(nd) g0(w
p ) = w
p g0(w
p )
so that the second and the third terms on the RHS of (38) are given by






















As it is reasonable to assume that b < w , this expression is positive. We
conclude therefore that X2 is positive, provided j￿j < 1, and b < w . Finally,
X3 is given by




which is negative. It represents the e⁄ect of an increase in the real bene￿t b
p
on aggregate excess demand. Given the government￿ s budget constraint (3), an
increase in the real bene￿ts leads to a decrease in government demand G . As
the marginal propensity to consume C2 is assumed smaller than 1, this must
decrease aggregate excess demand.
If we now assume that the direct price e⁄ect dominates the real bene￿t e⁄ect,
in the sense that
X1 ￿ X3(b=p2) < 0 (40)
it follows from (37) that ￿w(w;b) > 0 . Moreover, from (37) it also follows that
w
p ￿w(w;b) < 1 . This means that the elasticity of the equilibrium price level
with respect to the nominal wage level is smaller than 1.
From (36) we also easily derive that
￿b(w;b) =
X3(1=p)
X1 ￿ X2(w=p2) ￿ X3(b=p2)
(41)
Making the same sign assumptions as before, we conclude that ￿b(w;b) < 0.
Given the government￿ s budget constraint (3), an increase of b leads to a net
decrease in aggregate demand, so that the equilibrium price will decrease.
Appendix B Comparison of the slopes of QBRLG
and AT(b)
From p = ￿(w;b) and y = q( w
￿(w;b)) one easily derives that
(
dp = ￿w(:)dw + ￿b(:)db
dy = q0(:)(
p￿w￿w(:)
p2 )dw ￿ w
p2q0(:)￿bdb
(42)
From b = b(w) it also follows that
db = b0(w)dw (43)












The slope of AT(b) is given in (19). The inequalities
￿ ￿Slope QBRLG￿ ￿ Q
￿ ￿Slope AT(b)
￿ ￿






























which is again equivalent to b0(w) R 0.
Appendix C Comparison of the slopes of QBRLT
and AG(w)
From w = w(b) we derive that
dw = w0(b)db (46)












The slope of AG(w) is given in equation (13).The inequalities Slope QBRLT Q





























which is again equivalent to w0(b) R 0
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